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Abstract. This paper examines the impact of corporate governance 
quality on audit quality in Malaysia.  The sampling frame is 457 Malaysian 
non-finance listed companies, over the periods 2003 to 2007 (pre-2007 
Code period) and 2008 to 2012 (post -2007 Code period), consisting of 
2,285 observations for each period. This study uses pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) to test the research hypotheses and model. The results show 
that the effectiveness of the audit committee (AC) has no significant 
influence on audit fees in the pre- and post-2007 Code period, and the 
effectiveness of the board has no significant influence on audit fees in the 
pre-2007 Code period, although it has significant influence on audit fees in 
the post-2007 Code period. The results suggest that the existing corporate 
governance framework in relation to AC has limitation in its governance 
role on audit process. Our study contributes to existing literature conducted 
in the US, the UK and Australia where their institutional settings are 
different from that of Malaysia. In addition, our study is based on the 2007 
Code’s recommendation which contributes to the previous research 
conducted in Malaysia and provides an insightful evidence to the regulator 
on the corporate governance regime in Malaysia. 
1 Introduction 
In Malaysia, the board of directors (board) of public-listed companies have a fiduciary duty 
to act in the interest of the company. The board is required to establish an independent audit 
committee (AC) to implement and support the oversight function of the board. The 
governance role of the AC is to ensure that the interest of the shareholders are properly 
protected through the oversight of financial reporting and external audit processes. The 
governance role of the board and AC are governed by the Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia Securities Berhad (previously known as Listing Requirements of Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE)) [1, 2], [3-5] and Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance [6, 7].   
In the past two decades, high-profile financial cases pertaining to corporate governance 
scandals continuously plagued in Malaysia, such as Perwaja Steel Bhd, Aokam Perdana 
Bhd, Idris Hydraulic (M) Bhd, Transmile Group Berhad, Axis Incorporation Bhd, Megan 
Media Holdings Berhad, Linear Corp Bhd, Silver Bird Group Bhd and Malaysia Airline 
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Systems [8, 9]. These cases have caused a loss of public confidence in the role of auditors 
in preventing fraud. In addition, investors had lost confidence in the Malaysia market 
during the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis [10]. Consequently, the corporate governance 
framework in Malaysia was reformed. The regulators, the public and investors are now 
closely scrutinised on corporate governance in Malaysia.  
A number of studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance 
quality and audit quality, particularly on the governance role of the board and AC, in 
relation to their oversight of the external audit process. These studies are based on settings 
in the US [11, 12, 13], the UK [14, 15, 16], Australia [17] and Malaysia [18, 19, 20]. 
Previous studies conducted in the US, the UK and Australia did not provide conclusive 
evidence on the relationship between audit fees and the effectiveness of the board and AC. 
[15] and [12] found that audit committee independence has a significant and positive 
relationship with audit fees. However, this finding contrasted that of [11, 14, 17]. The 
results found in [12] on the relationship between audit committee expertise and audit fees 
also contrasted with the findings of [13, 16, 15, 17]. Similarly, [15] and [17] found that the 
frequency of audit committee meetings has a significant and positive relationship with audit 
fees did not support the findings of [11] and [12]. In the study of [12], there was no 
evidence to show that board independence has a significant relationship with audit fees; this 
result was not supported by [13, 15, 17]. The differences opinions in the US, the UK and 
Australia could be due to the country variations of corporate governance requirements. 
Previous studies in Malaysia have shown that the effectiveness of the board and AC 
variables were tested separately [18, 19, 20], with data prior to the implementation of the 
2007 Code [18, 19] and the study period covering a short time frame, i.e. three years or less 
[18, 19, 20].  Furthermore, the findings of these studies on the relationships between the 
audit fees and the effectiveness of the board and AC were inconclusive. [18] found that 
board independence, audit committee expertise and the frequency of audit committee 
meetings are significant and positively related to audit fees. This findings contrasted that of 
[19] and [20] who found board independence and frequency of audit committee meetings 
have no significant relationship with audit fees.   
Our study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and audit 
quality. We use the effectiveness of the board and AC as proxies of corporate governance 
quality and audit fees paid to the external auditor as the proxy of audit quality. The 
effectiveness of the board and AC are the best practices in corporate governance of the 
Code, the 2007 Code and corporate governance guide. The sample consists of 457 
Malaysian non-finance public-listed companies which had traded their shares on the main 
board of Bursa Malaysia from 2003 to 2012. We divided the ten-year data into two periods, 
i.e., pre-2007 Code period and post-2007 Code period, to test the relationship between the 
audit fees and the effectiveness of the board and AC before and after the introduction of the 
2007 Code.  
Our study shows that the effectiveness of the board and AC have no significant 
influence on audit fees in the pre-2007 Code period. In the post-2007 Code period, the 
effectiveness of the board is significant and positively related to audit fees; however, there 
is no evidence to show that the effectiveness of AC has significant influence on audit fees 
in the post-2007 Code period. This suggests that the existing corporate governance 
framework particularly on the board has an influence on the quality of audit process, but 
corporate governance framework in relation to audit committee has limitation in its 
governance role on audit process. Our results partially support the regulatory initiatives 
intention at enhancing role and responsibilities of the board and AC in order to improve the 
audit process.    
Nevertheless, this study contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, our data is 
based on the recommendations of the Code, the 2007 Code and corporate governance guide 
 
 









with a longer time-frame study period from 2003 to 2012 which enabled us to provide 
further empirical evidence that lending support to the latest corporate governance principles 
and best practices in enhancing the audit process. And secondly, our findings provide an 
insight evidence to the regulators, policy-makers, industry players and investors which 
shows that the principles and best practices of 2007 Code have its limitations in enhancing 
the audit process, alerting that such limitations need to be addressed in order to provide and 
sustain a sound corporate governance mechanism. 
The next section of this paper provides the hypotheses development followed by the 
research methods, results and discussion. The last session of this paper provides a 
conclusion of the study.  
2 Hypotheses development 
Audit committee is viewed as a monitoring mechanism and serves to support the oversight 
function of the board. There are studies based on agency theory which suggested that the 
board that emphasis a high quality of monitoring will demand a higher quality audit 
resulting in greater audit effort by the auditor and resulting higher fees [15, 27]. This study 
used the effectiveness of audit committee and the effectiveness of board as proxies for 
corporate governance quality. 
2.1 The effectiveness of audit committees (ACE) and audit fees (AF) 
A large number of international and national studies in previous years have addressed 
whether ACs are effective in terms of providing better quality of audit or improved internal 
control structure. Empirical evidence documented conflicting results on the impact of the 
effectiveness of the board and AC on the audit fees and the direction of the association 
between these variables. Consistent with previous studies [18, 15, 20], and based on the 
best practices in corporate governance of the Code, the 2007 Code and the corporate 
governance guide, we claim that audit committee independence, frequency of audit 
committee meetings, audit committee with financial expertise and audit committee size 
contribute to the effectiveness of AC.   
An independent AC demands a wider scope of audit from the external auditors and 
willing to support external auditors during scope intervention with management [12]. Audit 
committee with financial expertise has a better understanding on the auditing issues, risks, 
and the audit procedures that auditors propose to address auditing issues and risks [21, 22, 
12].  ACs who meet regularly have a better understanding of current auditing issues and 
have a positive influence on the scope of audit at different stages of the audit [12]. 
Company with larger AC is able to enhance its status and increased resources which may 
increase its effectiveness in fulfilling its monitoring role [15]. An effective AC in assuring 
the quality of audit process demands additional audit procedures from the external auditor, 
therefore increasing audit fees [14, 12, 15]. Based on these observations, we posit that an 
effective AC demands wider scope of audit from the external auditor, leading to a higher 
audit fees paid to the external auditor. Therefore, we offer our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1a. Companies with an effective AC are likely to be charged with higher audit fees in pre-
2007 Code period. 
H1b. Companies with an effective AC are likely to be charged with higher audit fees in post-
2007 Code period. 
2.2 The effectiveness of the board (BOD_E) and AF 
 
 









To be truly effective, a board needs more independent [11, 23] and diligent [11] directors 
on the board. Previous studies have found that a higher percentage of independent directors 
on the board helps to reduce the frequency of fraudulent financial reporting [24] and lower 
the occurrence of earnings overstatement [25]. [26] suggested that an effective board meets 
frequently. The board that meets frequently shows better diligence in discharging its 
responsibilities and improving its governance role of monitoring the financial reporting 
process [11]. Consistent with the best practices in corporate governance that recommended 
in the 2007 Code, we also included the board duality as one of the measurement for an 
effective board [7]. Board duality requires higher control of risk and higher audit effort and 
leading higher audit fees paid to external auditor [15]. 
Our study is based on the previous studies [11, 23], the best practices in corporate 
governance of the Code, the 2007 Code and the corporate governance guide to determine 
the effectiveness of the board (Table 2). Following the discussion above, we posit that an 
effective board will demand additional audit procedures from the external auditor to 
improve the financial reporting process, thus increasing the amount of audit fees paid to the 
external auditors. Therefore, we tender the following hypothesis:  
H2a. Companies with an effective board are likely to be charged with higher audit fees in 
pre-2007 Code period. 
H2b. Companies with an effective board are likely to be charged with higher audit fees in 
post-2007 Code period. 
3 Research methods 
3.1 Sample 
The sample consists of the Malaysian non-finance listed companies that had traded their 
shares on the main board of Bursa Malaysia for the years from 2003 to 2012. These 
companies are selected because they have gone through the changes of Malaysia corporate 
governance framework in 2000 (The Code) and 2007 (2007 Code). We split the study 
periods into two, i.e., 2003 to 2007 (pre-2007 Code period) and 2008 to 2012 (post-2007 
Code period). In the earlier period, corporate governance practices in Malaysia were based 
on principles and best practices of the Code and in the latter period were based on the 
principles and best practices of the 2007 Code. Consistent with previous studies, we have 
excluded finance listed companies in this study as they are governed by a different 
regulatory body [27, 28]. All data were hand collected from the annual financial statements 
available in the website of Bursa Malaysia. The sample size is 457 companies after further 
eliminating the companies with missing data. Table 1 provides the sample size and number 
of firm-year observations by industry.      
Table 1. Sample Size and Number of Observations 
  Number of Number of Observations 
Industry Sample (n) Pre-2007 Code Period Post-2007 Code Period 
Construction 31 155 155 
Consumer 84 420 420 
Industrial 143 715 715 
Plantation 29 145 145 
Property 62 310 310 
Technology 14 70 70 
Trading/Services 94 470 470 
Overall 457 2,285 2,285 
 
 









3.2 Measurement of variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Consistent with recent studies on audit fees [13, 19, 15], our dependent variable is the 
statutory audit fees paid to external auditors, measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees 
(lnAF). 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
ACE and BOD_E are the main independent variables in this study. ACE and BOD_E are 
measured based on the best practices in corporate governance of the Code, the 2007 Code 
and the corporate governance guide. The best practices in corporate governance in relation 
to AC include audit committee independence, frequency of audit committee meetings, audit 
committee with financial expertise and audit committee size. ACE is a dichotomous 
variable with 1 denoting (a) all AC members are non-executive directors with majority of 
independent directors, (b) at least one member is a member of accounting association or 
body, (c) at least three members in AC [6, 7], and (d) AC members meet at least four times 
per year [29] and 0 otherwise.  
The best practices in corporate governance pertaining to the board consist of board 
duality, board independence and frequency of board meetings. BOD_E is a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 when (a) the roles of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) are not 
combined, (b) at least one-third of the board membership are independent non-executive 
directors [6, 7], and (c) board members meet at least five times per year [29] and 0 
otherwise.  
3.2.3 Control variables 
In addition to the two independent variables, we control for the effects of other variables on 
audit fees that were found in previous studies [15, 30]. The control variables include LOSS, 
lnTA, LEV, BIG4, lnSUBs, NSH5_S. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
company is making loss during the year and 0 otherwise. lnTA is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets. LEV is the leverage level of the company, measured by the ratio 
of long-term debts to total assets. BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is 
audited by big-four auditor and 0 otherwise. lnSUBs represents the complexity of the 
company, measured as the natural logarithm of number of subsidiaries. NSH5_S is the total 
number of shareholders holding 5% or more shares in the company. We also control for the 
director’s remuneration (DR) on audit fees as the 2007 Code recommends that public-listed 
companies pay sufficient remuneration to attract and retain directors [7]. Hence, we expect 
director’s remuneration as one of the determinants of audit fees. DR is measured as the 
natural logarithm of remuneration paid to the directors. Consistent with previous studies [28, 
15], we include year and industry dummies to control for the unobserved effects during the 
sample period and the industry effect respectively. 
3.3 Regression model 
The regression model use to test the hypotheses in this study is as follows: 
 
lnAFit = β0 +  β1ACEit + β2BOD_Eit + β3lnDRit + β4LOSSit + β5lnTAit + β6LEVit + β7BIG4it + 
β8lnSUBsit + β9 NSH5_Sit + YEAR dummies + INDUSTRY dummies + eit  
 
 










Table 2 displays the definition of variables in the regression model. We use the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to explore the relationship between the audit 
fees and the effectiveness of the board and AC. 
 
Table 2. Definition of Variables 
No. Variables Definition 
1 LnAF Natural logarithm of audit fees (RM'000). 
2 ACE Audit committee effectiveness is a dichotomous variable; 1 if 
(a) all members of the AC are non-executive directors with 
majority of independence directors, (b) at least one member is 
a member of accounting association or body, (c) at least three 
members in AC and (d) AC meeting minimum four times per 
year and 0 otherwise. 
3 BOD_E Board effectiveness is  a dichotomous variable; 1 if (a) the 
roles of chairman and CEO are not combined, (b) at least one-
third of the board membership are independent non-executive 
directors and (c) board meeting minimum five times per year 
and 0 otherwise. 
4 lnDR Natural logarithm of director's remuneration (RM'000). 
5 LOSS A dichotomous variable, 1 if the company making loss during 
the year and 0 otherwise. 
6 lnTA Natural logarithm of total assets (RM'mil). 
7 LEV The ratio of total long-term debts to total assets.  
8 
BIG4 A dichotomous variable, 1 if the company is audited by big 
four auditor and 0 otherwise. 
9 lnSUBs Natural logarithm of number of subsidiaries.  
10 
NSH5_S Total number of shareholder holding 5% or more shares in the 
company.  
11 
YEAR  Year dummies. Dummy variables for each year from 2003 to 
2012. 
12 INDUSTRY Industry dummies. Dummy variables for each industry, i.e., 
construction, consumer, industrial, plantation, property, 
technology and trading/services.  
3.4 Correlations 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 report on the correlation matrix for the relevant variables 
for the pre-2007 Code period and post-2007 Code period respectively. There is no 
multicollinearity problem with other experimental variables and control variables as the 
correlations are all below 0.7 [31]. We also calculate the variance inflation factor (vif) for 
all variables and the results show that all vif values are less than 10.0 suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a substantive issue in this study [31, 32]. 
 
 









Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: 2003-2007 (n=457, 2,285 observations)           
(1) lnAF 1.00 
(2) ACE 0.05 1.00 
(3) BOD_E 0.03 0.08 1.00 
(4) lnDR 0.48 0.01 -0.03 1.00 
(5) LOSS -0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.22 1.00 
(6) lnTA 0.77 0.06 0.01 0.45 -0.17 1.00 
(7) LEV 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.14 1.00 
(8) BIG4 0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.00 1.00 
(9) lnSUBs 0.73 0.06 0.05 0.36 0.03 0.56 0.16 -0.04 1.00 
(10) NSH5_S -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.00 
Panel B: 2008-2012 (n=457, 2,285 observations) 
(1) lnAF 1.00 
(2) ACE 0.07 1.00 
(3) BOD_E 0.01 0.08 1.00 
(4) lnDR 0.53 0.11 -0.04 1.00 
(5) LOSS -0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.19 1.00 
(6) lnTA 0.79 0.03 -0.02 0.55 -0.17 1.00 
(7) LEV 0.27 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.31 1.00 
(8) BIG4 0.24 -0.02 -0.07 0.17 -0.14 0.29 0.06 1.00 
(9) lnSUBs 0.71 0.13 0.06 0.43 -0.02 0.58 0.30 0.04 1.00 
(10) NSH5_S 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.10  
4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Regression results 
Table 4 presents the OLS regression result of lnAF on ACE, BOD_E and control variables. 
The results show significant explanatory power with R2 of 0.762 in the pre-2007 Code 
period and 0.764 in the post-2007 Code period. Table 4 shows that in the pre-2007 Code 
period and post-2007 Code period, ACE is not significantly related to lnAF. This result is 
in contrast with our prediction that an effective AC demands wider scope of audit from the 
external auditor, leading to higher audit fees paid by the company. Thus, we have to reject 
the hypothesis H1a and H1b. The result shows that ACE has no influence on lnAF.  BOD_E 
is not significantly related to lnAF in the pre-2007 Code period. Therefore, we have to 
reject hypothesis H2a. BOD_E is significantly and positively related to lnAF at 5 percent 
level in the post-2007 Code period. This result in the post-2007 Code period is consistent 
with our prediction that an effective board demands higher quality of audit services to 
ensure reliability of financial statements, to complement its own monitoring managerial 
behavior and resulting in higher audit fees paid by the company. We do not reject the 
hypothesis H2b in post-2007 Code period. This suggests that only BOD_E has a significant 
influence on lnAF in the post-2007 Code period. 
 
 









The OLS regression result of lnAF on control variables shows that, in the pre-2007 
Code period and post 2007 Code period, lnDR, lnTA, lnSUBs are significant and positively 
related to audit fees at 1 percent level. LEV shows a statistically significant positive 
relationship with audit fees at 10 percent level in the pre-2007 Code period. In the post-
2007 Code period, LOSS and BIG4 are significant and positively related to audit fees at 1 
percent level. The result in this study also shows that there are both industry effect and time 
effect in the research model. 
 
Table 4. Regression of lnAF on ACE, BOD_E and Control Variables 
  2003-2007   2008-2012 
  Coefficient   t-statistic     Coefficient   t-statistic   
Constant 2.785   6.330     2.785   7.810 *** 
ACE -0.024   -0.530     0.022   0.610   
BOD_E 0.026   0.860     0.004   0.110 ** 
lnDR 0.080   3.540 ***   0.061   3.100 *** 
LOSS 0.059   1.560     0.119   3.320 *** 
lnTA 0.344   16.530 ***   0.367   18.160 *** 
LEV 0.275   1.850 *   -0.147   -0.840   
BIG4 0.055   1.390     0.149   3.680 *** 
lnSUBs 0.413   14.090 ***   0.402   14.180 *** 
NSH5_S -0.009   -1.160     -0.009   -0.840   
R2 0.762         0.764       
F-Statistic 113.000   ***     120.7   ***   
Industry effect Yes         Yes       
Year effect Yes         Yes       
Note: Variables are as defined in Table 2; *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
4.2 Discussion 
In this study, the results show that ACE has no significant influence on lnAF in the pre- and 
post-2007 Code period is in contrast with the result of [14, 12, 15]. These studies had 
argued that an effective AC demands addition audit procedures in order to assure the 
quality of audit process, leading to an increase in audit fees, is not supported by the results 
of our study. The results also show that BOD_E has no significant impact on lnAF in the 
pre-2007 Code period. The finding of BOD_E has a significant influence on lnAF in the 
post-2007 Code is consistent with the US study of [11, 13] and the UK study of [15] who 
found that an effective board helps to reduce the frequency of fraudulent financial reporting 
[24], lower the occurrence of earnings overstatement [25], improve its governance role of 
monitoring the financial reporting process [11] and enhance the quality of audit and 
financial reporting process [23] and therefore will demand more audit procedures from the 
auditors, leading to an increase in audit fees.  
In this study, we also find that lnTA, lnSUBs, LEV have a significant influence on lnAF 
in the pre-2007 Code period, lending support to the findings by [19, 15, 18, 15] had argued 
that companies with large total assets have more complex operations; companies with more 
subsidiaries have complex group transactions and weak internal control; companies with 
higher leverage will demand higher audit quality to protect themselves from business and 
finance risk and therefore increase the audit fees paid to the external auditor. In the post-
2007 Code period, lnTA, lnSUBs, LOSS and BIG4 have significant influenced on lnAF. 
 
 









These results also provide support to the findings by [19, 15]. Consistent with our 
expectation, lnDR has a statistically significant and positive relationship with lnAF in the 
pre- and post-2007 Code. This suggests that lnDR is an important determinant of audit fees.      
5 Conclusion 
Our study has provided an overview of the impact of the corporate governance quality on 
audit quality in Malaysia during the period from 2003 to 2012 (i.e., pre-and post-2007 Code 
period), using the effectiveness of the board and AC to proxy for corporate governance 
quality and audit fees to proxy for audit quality. The timeframe is interesting and 
appropriate as the Code was revised in 2007 and the 2007 Code was aimed at strengthening 
the roles and responsibilities of the board and AC. The sample has focused on 457 non-
financial companies that had listed and traded their shares on the main board of Bursa 
Malaysia from 2003 to 2012. There is no evidence to show that the effectiveness of AC has 
a significant influence on audit fee in the pre- and post-2007 Code period. The results also 
show that the effectiveness of the board does not has a significant influence on audit fees in 
the pre-2007 Code period but it has significant influenced on the audit fees in the post-2007 
Code period. This suggests that the existing corporate governance framework particularly 
on the board has an influence on the quality of audit process, but the corporate governance 
framework in relation to audit committee has limitation in its governance role on audit 
process. Our results partially support the regulatory initiatives intention at enhancing role 
and responsibilities of the board and AC in order to improve the audit process.  
This study is subject to a number of limitations that need to be considered in future 
research. Firstly, the use quantitative research method and secondary data to explore the 
effectiveness of the board and AC may not reflect the true performance of the board and 
AC. We suggest to use qualitative research method to explore the performance of the board 
and AC on governance outcomes by including other attributes such as the board and AC’s 
individual behavior, informal networks of the board and AC, the relationship among the 
board, AC and external auditors and the supervisory and compliance structure of the 
company. Secondly, our study did not make allowance for the political connections and 
ethnicity documented in previous studies conducted in Malaysia; this should be considered 
for future study.  
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